Abstract: LLNL is actively engaged in the development of a variety of advanced technologies for use in detecting potential threats in sea-going cargo containers, particularly the presence of hidden special nuclear materials (SNM). One such project is the so-called "Nuclear Car Wash" (NCW), which uses a high-energy neutron probe to scan the container. High-energy, β-delayed γ rays emitted during the decay of short-lived, neutron-induced fission products are then taken as a signature of fissionable material. There are a number of different threat decision metrics that one could imagine using in conjunction with an inspection system such as the NCW; however, the most straightforward approach might be to simply compare the total number of counts that our detector records during some suitably chosen time interval to the average background signal that one would expect from a "clean" container during the same interval. The purpose of this report is to describe the basic statistical properties of a decision metric of this sort and outline the procedures for using it in experimental practice.
Introduction
LLNL is actively engaged in the development of a variety of advanced technologies for use in detecting potential threats in sea-going cargo containers, particularly the presence of hidden special nuclear materials (SNM). One such project is the so-called "Nuclear Car Wash" (NCW), which uses a high-energy (E n ≈ 3.5-7.0 MeV), D(d,n) 3 He neutron probe to scan the container [1] . High-energy (E γ ≥ 2.5 MeV), β-delayed γ rays emitted during the decay of short-lived, neutroninduced fission products may then be taken as a signature of fissionable material [2] since there are relatively few neutron-induced or naturally-occurring interference signals above a few MeV in energy. The ultimate sensitivity of this (or any other) cargo inspection system will depend on the acceptable false alarm rate ( ! P fa ), the required probability of detecting real threats ( ! P d ) and, of course, the decision metric used to make the call.
There are a number of different, potentially very powerful, threat decision metrics that one could imagine using in conjunction with an inspection system such as the NCW (e.g. those recently proposed by Pruet, et al. [3] , which involve multi-parameter fits to the time structure of the observed data); however, the most straightforward approach (and perhaps our initial "call to arms") might be to simply compare the total number of counts that our detector records during some suitably chosen time interval (e.g. one which will allow us to capture the majority of the delayed γ rays from short-lived SNM fission products, if any) to the average background signal that one would expect from a "clean" container during the same interval. The purpose of this report is to describe the basic statistical properties of a decision metric of this sort and outline the procedures for using it in experimental practice. 1 1 Note that, while this may on the surface seem hardly worthy of a formal report, the devil lies in the details and the correct procedures for using a metric of this sort may not be what one would naively expect …
Analysis in terms of measured counts
In order to make semi-quantitative estimates for critical threat signal levels and their associated signal-to-noise ratios, we will assume that the total number of counts ! " " S that our detector records during a time interval ∆t is a discrete random variable drawn from a Gaussian-like distribution whose mean and variance are given by:
where ! " " T ≥ 0 is our SNM threat signal (assumed to be distributed Poisson), ! " " T is the hypothetical mean value of [4] . Since the vast majority of containers scanned will (we hope) not contain SNM (i.e.
, this issue will resolve itself in time as we inspect more and more containers with a variety of cargos and eventually establish stable values for 
where N (large) is the total number of measurements made; therefore, we will take
to be known quantities in the following analysis.
The threat decision metric of interest to us here is again simply
e. the difference between the total number of counts that our detector records during a time interval ∆t and the average background signal that one would expect from a "clean" container during the same interval. The mean and variance of ! " " D are given by:
where we have made use of the fact that, for N large (i.e. after we have inspected many "clean" containers), involves determining whether or not it can be confidently identified as a "statistical outlier" in relation to the known distribution of data on "clean" containers. In our case, this essentially reduces to determining the "statistical significance" of [5] . Having assumed Gaussian-like distributions, we may therefore define a standard normal test statistic of the form:
to help us to make quantitative decisions of this sort about the value of
In spite of the potentially dire consequences of failing to detect a hidden nuclear threat in a cargo container (e.g. admitting entry of clandestine nuclear material or even a nuclear device), the intense nature of operations at a port facility will usually require that containers be given a "speedy trial" (e.g. ≈ 1-2 min interrogation times) during which they are presumed to be "innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" in order to avoid (or at least minimize) the almost certain drawbacks associated with generating an excessive number of false alarms (e.g. impeding the flow of commerce, developing a reputation as "the system that cries wolf", etc.); therefore, we will adopt
2 ) as our "null hypothesis" and recast the test statistic of Eqn. (4) as:
We may then specify a critical value of
which makes
is as small as needed to meet operational goals (e.g.
, we may confidently reject our "null hypothesis" and declare the container to be a nuclear threat knowing that the probability of our being wrong is less than or equal to ! " . Sample plots of 
2 Note that standard normal probabilities such as P(z ≥ z(crit)) = 1-P(z ≤ z(crit)) may be calculated in spreadsheet programs such as MS Excel ® using the NORMDIST() function (e.g.
and then plotting Figure 2 for sample plots of
. Alternatively, if we have already defined a specific target value of
Sample plots of Figures 3a and 3b , respectively. The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) associated with a specific value of ! " " T (crit) may also be of interest from an experimental point of view. By definition, this is given by:
where ! " " T (crit) has the functional form shown in Eqn. (8) . Sample plots of
and ! " " B are shown in Figures 4a and 4b , respectively. It is interesting to note that
; therefore, for a plausible set of NCW operational parameters such as
the threshold SNR for
! " " T ) should not exceed a value of 4.745, regardless of the measured value of ! " # # B . Finally, so-called "Receiver Operating Characteristic" (ROC) curves are generally accepted as the standard way to graphically summarize the performance of a decision metric. In our case, ROC curves for any specific value of ! " " T may be obtained by plotting 
Extrapolation to particles at detector interface
Unless the detectors associated with our inspection system are 100% efficient (not likely to be the case), the next step in the analysis of our threat decision metric will be to extrapolate the various critical values defined in § 2 above in terms of measured counts (e.g.
T (crit))) back to their counterparts defined in terms of particles arriving at the detector interface (e.g.
Although we rarely stop to think about it, detector counting statistics actually reflect the conditional binomial probability 
which certainly comes as no surprise; however, the general relationship between
is not quite as straightforward:
If (again, as is likely the case) the background signal
, then Eqn. (12a) reduces to the familiar result:
Estimating true threat signal strength
Having defined the critical SNM threat signal level for our decision metric in terms of both measured counts ( ! " " T (crit)) and particles arriving at the detector interface ( ! " T (crit)) for a given set of system operational parameters (e.g. ! P fa and ! P d ), the operative question becomes, "What does this tell us about the critical value of the true threat signal ! T (crit) at its origin and, in particular, what does it tell us about the smallest mass of SNM that we could reasonably expect to detect with a cargo inspection system such as the NCW?" The answer in both cases is, unfortunately, almost nothing (how anticlimactic!).
The critical value of the true SNM threat signal at its origin will depend on the detailed design of the inspection system and the specific threat scenario considered. While the background signal statistics (e.g. T (crit) for our decision metric) will depend on the efficiency of the detectors used in the inspection system and their location relative to the container. Even if the background signal statistics are assumed to be well known, the true SNM threat signal will still depend on a plethora of other factors including the intensity and energy spectrum of the neutron probe used by the inspection system, the elemental composition and physical arrangement of legitimate cargo in the container, the physical configuration of the SNM (e.g. spheres, cylinders, plates, powder, etc.) and its proximity to legitimate (or clandestine) materials which might accidentally (or intentionally) tend to conceal its presence in some way and, needless to say, the actual location of the SNM in relation to the neutron source and detector system (note that all factors associated with the shape of the SNM, its shielding (whether accidental or intentional) and its final placement in the container are at the complete discretion of the nefarious characters at-tempting to smuggle the material in). Although some simplifying assumptions can certainly be made (e.g. homogeneous cargo distributions, pure exponential attenuation of neutron and γ-ray fluxes, etc.), the shear complexity of this eclectic mix of largely indeterminate variables makes the task of extracting a unique value for the true SNM threat signal ! T (crit) at its origin analytically intractable from any practical point of view; however, as intrepid scientists we needn't be discouraged by this minor inconvenience, because this is a perfect example the sort of problem that God created Monte Carlo codes to address! Modern, general-purpose Monte Carlo radiation transport algorithms such as LLNL's COG code package [6] are now capable of simulating not only the physical layout of proposed cargo inspection systems such as the NCW, but also the detailed characteristics of the system's highintensity D(d,n) 3 He neutron source [7] and the β-delayed γ-ray spectra emitted during the decay of neutron-induced SNM fission products [8] . A series of Monte Carlo simulations of the NCW system could easily be done with different physical configurations of SNM placed in the most challenging locations in a container with "worst-probable-case" cargo configurations to obtain credible values for the limiting number of γ rays that one might expect to see at the detector interface in those scenarios. When coupled with measured detector efficiencies and either measured values or "worst-case" simulations of the background signal, these calculations could then be used to at least place an upper bound on the value of ! T (crit) and thereby derive an estimate for the smallest mass of SNM that we could reliably detect.
Summary and comments
The statistical properties of the threat decision metric
B have been described and procedures have been outlined for using it in conjunction with a cargo inspection system such as the NCW to define critical (i.e. minimum detectable) SNM threat signal levels in terms of both measured counts ( ! " " T (crit)) and particles arriving at the detector interface ( ! " T (crit)) for a given set of system operational parameters (e.g. 2 ) are eventually known, the complex mix of largely indeterminate variables associated with NCW inspection scenarios will make the task of extracting a unique value for the true SNM threat signal ! T (crit) at its origin analytically intractable; however, detailed Monte Carlo simulations of a carefully-chosen set of "worst-case" inspection scenarios should allow us to at least bound the problem and derive meaningful estimates for ! T (crit) and the smallest detectable mass of SNM. Finally, it should be noted that, while the present report has focused on the potential use of this decision metric with the NCW inspection system, it is perhaps even better suited for use in conjunction with the so-called "long dwell time" problem in which small radiation detectors are placed in individual containers aboard ship and allowed to integrate over the local background and any potential SNM threat signal for the entire time that the ship is at sea in transit between ports. In this case, the passive SNM threat signal (if any) will be due to β-delayed γ rays from spontaneous fission products along with α decay of certain SNM isotopes and the background signal will be due almost entirely to cosmic rays and the decay of naturally-occurring radioisotopes in the surrounding cargo. Since these radiation sources are known to be distributed Poisson, the procedures for using the metric would actually be more straightforward.
Appendix A (a brief statistics lesson)
Let ! X be a discrete random variable (RV) with probability distribution function (PDF)
that represents the total number of events associated with some physical process of interest (we will avoid making assumptions about 
where we replaced The easiest way to derive an expression for ! " Y 2 at this point is to make use of the following identities (true for any random variable V):
Since we already know that , then we may confidently declare the container to be a nuclear threat knowing that the probability of our being wrong is less than or equal to P fa . 
